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• 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(e), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony. Appellant was convicted of Attempted Theft by Deception, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-405. Appellant filed a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing on April 23, 2014. That 
motion was denied on January 2, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing. 
Determinative law: Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302; State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 
285, 221 P.3d 273; State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 582. 
Standard of review: An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's order of 
restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its 
discretion. Furthermore, whether a restitution award is proper depends solely upon 
interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for correctness. See State v. 
Harvell, 2009 UT App 271, ~ 7,220 P.3d 174. 
Issue No. 2 
Issue: Whether Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel to Defendant by failing to submit a written request for a restitution hearing at the 
trial court's direction. 
Determinative law: The United States Supreme Court set forth the proper test for 
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984): 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of due process. Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or judgment resulted 
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 
Standard of review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first 
time on appeal are questions of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Vos, 2007 UT 
App 215,, 9, 164 P.3d 1258. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend. VI: Addendum A 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12: Addendum B 
Utah Code§ 77-38a-302 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 19, 2010, Mr. Speed was charged by Information with one count of 
Theft by Deception, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-6-405. (R7-9.) 
Three co-defendants were charged in the same case. (R3-10.) A preliminary hearing was 
scheduled for May 4, 2010, and Mr. Speed waived his right to a preliminary hearing. 
(R22.) Mr. Speed was bound over for trial. (Id.) Mr. Speed was arraigned on July 9, 2010. 
(R23.) 
On August 13, 2010, Mr. Speed pleaded guilty to an amended Information of 
Attempted Theft by Deception, a Third-Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405. (R24-32.) The following factual basis was given for the charge: 
Mr. Van de Camp: Judge, on or about June 1st of 2009-this went on for a 
while. My client exercised unauthorized contn.il of the property of another 
by deception that he intended to deprived [sic] the owner of the value, 
which exceeded $5,000. 
What he essentially did, was he was a manger of a cell phone store and he 
was sending phones to himself and then selling or giving those phones 
away. That value exceed $5,000. In fact it was quite significant. And we 
don't have any formal agreements with regard to the total amount, but we 
will probably come back before this court to determine what that total 
restitution will be as well as what the court-ordered restitution will be 
because of its significant number. 
(R121 at 5:2-14.) The Court ordered Mr. Speed to report to Adult Probation & Parole for 
a pre-sentence report. (R34.) 
On October 15, 2010, Mr. Speed was sentenced to an indetenninate term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. (R46-47.) The prison term was suspended. 
(Id.) Mr. Speed was also sentenced to six days jail, with credit for the six days previously 
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served. (Id.) He was fined $750 and required to complete 150 hours of community 
service. (Id.) Mr. Speed was placed on 36 months of probation. (Id.) One of the 
conditions of probation listed in the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment was to "pay 
restitution." (Id.) 
At the hearing, the judge asked Mr. Speed to pay restitution in the amount of 
$126,547. (R122 at 9:17-18.) Judge Atherton stated that she would allow defense counsel 
to respond, but that she wanted to "get this on" rather than deferring it. (Id. at 9:17-23.) 
Judge Atherton wanted Mr. Speed to make monthly payments every single month so that 
ACS would "immediately start getting reimbursed for their losses. (Id. at 9:23-10:2.) The 
following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Van de Camp: And Your Honor, speaking with Mr. Renteria a little 
while ago, we talked about having a restitution hearing to determine what 
court-ordered restitution and total restitution would be. 
The Court: Well, get closer. If there are disputes I - I set a lot of these 
restitution hearings because it's murky. So what I want you to do is file a 
motion for restitution. 
Mr. Van de Camp: Okay. 
The Court: And with some specifics about what I can look at before we get 
to the restitution hearing -
Mr. Van de Camp: Right. 
The Court: -- and nobody knows anything. 
Mr. Van de Camp: Yeah. I think- it's not a complicated- I don't think 
it's going to be a complicated hearing. The only issue is really addressing 
his availability to pay and those resources he has available to pay this whole 
amount. 
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The Court: Well, let's get all of that documentation then. 
Mr. Van de Camp: Okay. 
The Court: I will set it for hearing. 
Mr. Van de Camp: Okay. And, Your Honor, how long do we have to file 
that motion, just so -
The Court: Whenever you want. 
Mr. Van de Camp: Okay. Thank you. (End of hearing.) 
(Rl22 at 10:10-11 :10.) The record contains two signed orders of the minutes from the 
Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment hearing: the first specifies the amount of 
restitution, but the second only orders the defendant to "pay restitution." Compare R43-
45 with R46-47. 
On February 22,2011, AP&P filed a Progress Report with the Court. (R48-49.) 
<ii AP&P notes that Mr. Speed had been sentenced on October 15, 2010, and one of the 
terms of his probation was to "[p ]ay restitution in the amount of $TBD." (Id.) AP&P 
requested the court order the fine dismissed because Mr. Speed completed his community 
service, and order probation closed as successful, or transferred to Court Probation if the 
court deemed further supervision necessary. (Id.) On February 17, 2011, the court ordered 
the fine dismissed but noted that it was too early to terminate probation because only four 
of the 36 months had been completed. (Id.) 
On July 26, 2011, AP&P filed another Progress Report with the court and again 
requested that probation be closed as successful. (RS0-52.) AP&P noted that one of the 
conditions of probation was for Mr. Speed to "[p ]ay restitution in reference to case 
5 
#101901272." (Id.) The court denied AP&P's request, but later signed a new Sentence, 
Judgment, and Commitment order specifying an amount of restitution on February 27, 
2012. (R53-55.) 1 
On September 24, 2013, AP&P filed another Progress Report. (R57-58.) AP&P 
again noted that a term of probation was to "[p]ay restitution in the amount of $TBD." 
(Id.) For the first time, an amount of restitution appeared in the financial summary, and 
AP&P stated that Mr. Speed "has a very large restitution amount, and he understands he 
will be paying on it for several years, if not forever." (Id.) 
On October 1, 2013, Judge Vernice Trease issued a minute entry giving the 
prosecution and defense counsel 14 days to submit any objections or other input regarding ~ 
AP&P's recommendation. (R56.) The minute order only stated that "any remaining 
financial obligations be referred to Office of State Debt Collection," without specifically 
mentioning restitution. (Id.) The minute order was served on the State and Mr. Speed's 
trial counsel, Mr. Van de Kamp. (Id.) Upon receiving no opposition from the prosecutor, 
the court granted the request to tenninate probation and send the remaining restitution to 
OSDC. (R59.) 
On October 30, 2013, the Court received a letter from the defendant requesting a 
restitution hearing. (R60.) Mr. Speed stated that he was eighteen months into his 
probation before he received any notice of the restitution amount that he would be paying, 
1 The Sentence, Judgment, Commitment is dated October 15, 2010, but the record reflects 
that it was entered February 27, 2012. 
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and by then there was already $7,000 in accumulated interest. (Id.) He stated that his le~al 
(j) defender did not discuss the restitution process with him, and he wanted a chance to 
dispute that amount. (Id.) 
On September 11, 2014, counsel for Mr. Speed filed a Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing. (R85-90.) A hearing was held on 
December 5, 2014. Judge Trease found that even though the restitution amount was not 
contained on the original judgment, sentence, and commitment, Judge Atherton stated the 
amount in the transcript and so that omission must have been a "clerical error." (R123 at 
9:17-21.) Judge Trease also found that because Mr. Speed did not object to the restitution 
8 being sent to debt collection pursuant to the October 1, 2013 minute order, Mr. Speed 
waived any objection to the restitution. (Id. at 10: 17-23.) Finally, Judge Trease found that 
the onus was on defense counsel to file a motion for a restitution hearing, rather than on 
the State. (Id. at 11: 16-21.) 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on December 24, 2014. (RIOI.) After the minutes 
from the restitution hearing were officially entered on January 2, 2015, an Amended 
Notice of Appeal was filed on January 4, 2015. (R107.) Mr. Speed is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 5, 2009, the director of security for ACS Incorporated ("ACS") 
contacted the Salt Lake City Police Department to report that some employees of the 
company had been involved in fraudulent activity. (R37.) ACS was an infonnation 
technology outsource company that worked in conjunction with Verizon Wireless. (Id.) 
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ACS handled the customer calls for Verizon Wireless, and had supervisors that oversaw 
the call takers. (Id.) The supervisors were authorized to discount telephones to customers, 
which might occur if a customer complained or wanted to cancel their service. (Id.) 
ACS discovered that a number of supervisors, including Mr. Speed, were taking 
advantage of their ability to give discounts. (Id.) The supervisors would discount the 
phones to nothing, and then sell those phones. (Id.) ACS told Salt Lake City detectives 
that Mr. Speed sent out a total of $123,153 in free phones, but Mr. Speed claimed that 
some of the phones sent out were to actual customers. (R38.) A detective went through 
ACS statements for a few months and concluded that the value of the phones illegally 
sent out by the defendant during those few months was $63,758.82. (Id.) ACS requested 
restitution in the amount of $126,547. (R40.) However, there is no evidence supporting 
that amount on the record. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Request for a Restitution Hearing because it failed to comply with several 
statutory requirements for the imposition of restitution. First, the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to afford Mr. Speed a full restitution hearing when he objected to the 
amount of restitution alleged by the victim. The trial court also failed to detennine court-
ordered restitution, including considering all the relevant factors, within a year after 
sentencing. Finally, the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on restitution 
from the prosecutor to the defense. 
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In the alternative, if this Court finds that Mr. Speed waived his objections to 
e restitution through his counsel's actions, the Court should find that Mr. Speed's trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Speed's trial counsel failed to file 
a motion for restitution at the trial court's direction, even though he knew his client 
disputed the amount of restitution and wanted a hearing on the matter. This deficient 
performance greatly prejudiced Mr. Speed, as it deprived him of his due process rights to 
a restitution hearing and has saddled him with an enormously burdensome debt. 
Therefore, Mr. Speed respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order, 
or in the alternative, remand the proceedings so that a restitution hearing may be held 
'I> with the trial court. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and Request for a Restitution Hearing. 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and Request for a Restitution Hearing because Mr. Speed was denied his right 
to a full restitution hearing, court-ordered restitution was not determined within a year of 
sentencing, and the State failed to meet its burden of proof on restitution. 
A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is beyond the limits of 
reasonableness. See State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 16, 223 P .3d 1103; State v. Alfatlawi, 
2006 UT App 511, 1 20, 153 P .3d 804. If the actions of the trial court are inherently 
unfair, it has also abused its discretion. See State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, ,r 4, 194 
P.3d 195 (mem.), cert. denied, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah 2010). 
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Utah's restitution statutory scheme identifies several strict prerequisites for the 
imposition of any restitution on a criminal defendant, which were not complied with in 
this case. This statutory scheme identifies two separate types of restitution: complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2) (2013). 
The court is required by law to determine "complete restitution," which is "restitution 
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant." Id. (emphasis 
added). In contrast, the court has discretion to impose "court-ordered restitution" and 
actually order the defendant to pay an amount in restitution. Id. The court retains total 
discretion to decide whether the defendant should pay any restitution, or to order the 
defendant to pay an amount less than determined to be complete restitution. Id. 
In detennining whether restitution is appropriate, "the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5)." Id. § 77-38a-302(1) 
( emphasis added). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate, it "shall" make 
the reasons for the decision part of the court record. Id. § 77-38a-302(3). Should the 
Court order complete restitution, it must consider all relevant facts and make all necessary 
findings on the record. Id. § 77-38a-302(5)(b ). 
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider each of the following factors: 
(i) the factors listed in Subsections S(a) and (b) (for determining complete 
restitution; 
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial 
declaration described in Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other 
obligations of the defendant; 
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• 
• 
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
See id. § 77-38a-302(5)(c). "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue." Id. § 77-38a-302(4) (emphasis added). 
A. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Speed's Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing because Mr. 
Speed was denied a full restitution hearing after he objected to the amount of 
restitution at sentencing. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing because Mr. Speed was never 
afforded a full and complete restitution hearing despite his objection to the amount of 
restitution. 
Utah law is clear that when a defendant has any objection to "the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing 
on the issue." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(4). "A defendant has all the due process 
rights inherent in such a hearing and also has the right to appeal the resulting 
Ci determination." State v. Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, ,r 15, 208 P.3d 543. Utah's 
Restitution Act does not contain any requirement that the defendant file a motion for a 
restitution hearing; rather, if it is clear that the defendant disputes some aspect of a 
restitution order, the trial court is obligated to afford the defendant a full hearing. 
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In State v. Haga, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to 
hold a restitution hearing because the defendant requested a restitution hearing at his 
sentence, but never received one. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Under both 
the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires criminal 
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably reliable 
information. See State v. Gomez, 887 P .2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994 ). Thus, "fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the right to 
examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which 
his sentence is based." Id. at 855. However, procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied 
when the "defendant had a full opportunity ... to examine and challenge all factual 
information upon which the court based his sentence." Id.; see also State v. Weeks, 2000 
UT App 273, ,r 8, 12 P.3d 110. 
In State v. Gibson, the Utah Court of Appeals found the record clearly reflected 
that the parties were in a dispute about the exact amount of restitution owed. 2009 UT 
App 108, ,r 14. Due to this disagreement, the Gibson court found that the district court 
appropriately scheduled a restitution hearing. See id. ( citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
203(2)( c) ). There is no indication that, after the parties indicated their dispute over the 
amount of restitution, the trial court in Gibson required a motion to be filed in order to 
schedule a hearing. See id. 
Like the defendant in Gibson, Mr. Speed clearly indicated his objection to the 
amount of restitution recommended in the pre-sentence report. At sentencing, Judge 
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Atherton asked Mr. Speed to pay restitution in the amount of $126,547. (R122 at 9: 17-
Gi 18.) Judge Atherton stated that she would allow defense counsel to respond, but that she 
wanted to "get this on" rather than deferring it. (Id. at 9: 17-23.) Judge Atherton wanted 
Mr. Speed to make monthly payments every single month so that ACS would 
"immediately start getting reimbursed for their losses." (Id. at 9 :23-10:2.) Mr. Speed's 
trial counsel, Brock Van de Kamp, immediately notified Judge Atherton that he had 
spoken to the prosecutor and they wanted to have a restitution hearing to detennine what 
complete and court-ordered restitution would be. (Rl22 at 10:10-11:10.) Judge Atherton 
acknowledged that she sets a lot of restitution hearings when there are disputes, and asked 
trial counsel to file a "motion for restitution" so she can look at specifics before the 
restitution hearing. (Id.) Mr. Speed's trial counsel represented that it would likely not be a 
complicated hearing, but that they would be addressing Mr. Speed's availability to pay the 
whole amount. (Id.) Judge Atherton then stated, "I will set it for hearing." (Id.) Judge 
Atherton told trial counsel that he could file that documentation "[w]henever [he] 
want[s]." (Id.) 
This exchange between Judge Atherton and defense counsel was sufficient to put 
Judge Atherton on notice of Mr. Speed's objection to the amount of restitution. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4) only requires the defendant to make some objection to the 
"imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution" before the trial court is obligated to 
allow the defendant a full hearing on restitution. Once Judge Atherton was aware that the 
defense and the prosecutor had a dispute over restitution, she should have scheduled the 
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restitution hearing. 
Similar to Gibson, the dispute over the amount of restitution was identified at the 
sentencing hearing on the record, rather in a written motion. 2009 UT App 108, il 14. Like 
the trial court in Gibson, Judge Atherton should have scheduled the restitution hearing 
upon learning that there was a dispute. See id. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge 
Atherton to require defense counsel to file a motion for restitution prior to scheduling the 
hearing, as that adds an additional requirement not contemplated by the statute and is 
therefore inherently unfair to Mr. Speed. See State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, ,I 4. 
Further, Mr. Speed did not waive his right to a restitution hearing when his trial 
counsel did not file a "motion for restitution." As noted above, Mr. Speed's ... Also, it is 
unclear from Judge Atherton's response to trial counsel's proffers whether the filing of 
the motion for restitution was required before Judge Atherton would set the hearing. (See 
RI 22 at I 0: I 0-11: IO ("I will set it for hearing.").) Judge Atherton also told Mr. Speed's 
counsel that he could file the documentation that would be presented at the hearing 
"[w]henever [he] want[s]." (Id.) It would be inherently unfair and contrary to Utah law to 
find that Mr. Speed waived his right to a restitution hearing by his counsel's failure to file 
a motion not contemplated by the statute, particularly when trial counsel was given an 
open-ended deadline to do so. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should find that Judge 
Atherton's failure to schedule a hearing was an abuse of discretion and was based on a 
misinterpretation of Utah's Restitution Act, and therefore Judge Trease's denial of Mr. 
Speed's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for Restitution Hearing was 
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erroneous. 
B. Because the trial court did not order a certain amount of restitution within 
one year of sentencing, it lacked jurisdiction to do so when it amended the 
Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment on February 27, 2012 to include a 
restitution amount. 
In the alternative, if the Court finds that Judge Atherton ordered restitution at 
sentencing and Mr. Speed either failed to properly object or waived an objection, the 
Court should vacate the order of restitution because it was not entered within one year of 
sentencing. "Jurisdiction to order restitution in a criminal case is statutory." State v. 
Poole, 2015 UT App 220, if 5. Utah law requires that a trial court "shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after 
sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i) (emphasis added). Therefore, Utah's 
Restitution Act requires that the district court "determine ... court-ordered restitution" and 
e "make all restitution orders" no later than one year from sentencing. Id.; see also id. § 77-
3 8a-302(2)(b ). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently clarified that this one-year requirement for 
making a restitution order is not satisfied by an order that does not include an amount and 
is therefore incomplete. Poole, 2015 UT App 220, if 11. In Poole, the defendant had 
agreed to pay restitution as part of a plea deal, and the trial court converted the 
defendant's fines to community service because it recognized that the defendant was 
going to have "a bunch of restitution ... to pay off." See id. if 2. However, because the 
State only had a preliminary estimate of damages at the time of sentencing, the trail court 
agreed to hold restitution open for up to one year, and directed the State to submit its 
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restitution request within ninety days of sentencing. See id. The State failed to do so. 
Eleven months after sentencing, the State moved for an order of restitution. See id. 
~ 4. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court granted the motion, and entered a 
restitution order fifteen months after sentencing. See id. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals vacated the restitution order. See id. ~ 22. The court found that Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302(2)(b) plainly requires that an order of restitution with a sum certain be issued 
within a year. See id. 1 11. The mere filing of a motion for restitution or a court's 
statement of intent to set restitution at some future date did not toll that one-year time 
period. See id. Therefore, the court's statements at sentencing that it planned to order 
restitution upon receiving evidence of the amount owed-even if those statements 
established a condition of probation-did not meet the statutory requirement for a final 
restitution order. See id. Because the restitution order, including the amount, was not 
issued until fifteen months after sentencing, the order was vacated for lack of strict 
compliance with the one-year limitation. See id. 11 20-21. 
a. The last signed Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment did not specify 
an amount of restitution. 
Similar to the judge in Poole, Judge Atherton ordered that Mr. Speed was required 
to pay restitution as part of his sentence, but did not specify an amount in the signed 
order. One of the conditions of probation listed in the Sentence, Judgment, and 
Commitment was to "pay restitution," but the order did not specify an amount. (R46-47.) 
This is reflected in the Progress Reports filed by AP &P. The reports from February 22, 
2011, and September 24, 2013, state that one of the terms of probation was to "[p]ay 
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restitution in the amount of $TBD." (R48-49, 57-58.) The report from July 26, 2011, only 
(ii indicates that Mr. Speed was required to pay restitution in reference to case #101901272. 
(RS0-52.) Although Judge Atherton discussed the amount of complete restitution at the 
sentencing hearing, no final amount was included in the order-likely because the trial 
court had not yet determined the amount of court-ordered restitution, as explained below. 
In ruling on Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for 
Restitution Hearing, Judge Trease determined that the failure to include an amount was a 
"clerical error." Such a finding was an abuse of discretion, because defendants should be 
able to rely on a trial court's signed order to include all the terms of a sentence. Further, 
AP&P's reliance on the fact that the amount of restitution was to be determined, and the 
court's failure to correct that tenn of probation, indicates more than a "clerical error." 
Because all restitution orders, including an amount of court-ordered restitution, 
were not entered into the record until sixteen months after sentencing on February 27, 
2012, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter in those orders. 
b. Judge Atherton never determined "court-ordered restitution." 
Judge Atherton never determined "court-ordered restitution," and because more 
than a year has passed since sentencing, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to do so. In 
@ determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court 
is required to consider the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c). These 
factors include the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in a financial 
declaration, and the ability of the defendant to pay restitution. See id. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has found that a sentencing court is not required to 
reference each of the required factors on the record; but, the sentencing court must set 
forth the reasons for its restitution decision in the record. See State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 
ljf 25 n.11, 61 P.3d 1000. "There is no mandatory requirement in the language of the 
statute that a sentencing court make a record setting forth its reasoning as to each of the 
factors in its restitution order, only that it consider each factor and make a record setting 
forth the reasons for its decision." State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, ljf 29, 72 P.3d 692. 
In Smith, the court found that in the absence of any additional record findings, it 
was forced to limit its review to the language of the restitution order. See id. ljf 30. Based 
upon the language of this order, the appellate court easily understood the defendant's 
confusion concerning the restitution amount, as nowhere in the order did the court explain 
its rationale for the amount ordered or the reasoning underlying its decision. See id. 
Although it is permissible to assume that the trial court considered all of the required 
factors, this recourse is only available if it is reasonable to do so. See id. ljf 30 n. 9. In 
Smith, the appellate court concluded that it would not be reasonable to assume that all of 
the restitution factors were considered absent some evidence to the contrary. See id. 
In this case, Judge Atherton recognized that Mr. Speed was going to have a large 
amount of restitution to pay off. (Rl22 at 9:17-18.) Judge Atherton wanted Mr. Speed to 
begin reimbursing ACS for its losses while a restitution hearing was pending. (Id.) Judge 
Atherton was also aware that the restitution hearing would focus on the amount of court-
ordered restitution. (Id.) Upon hearing that there was a dispute as to the ultimate amount 
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that Mr. Speed would be ordered to pay in restitution, Judge Atherton advised the parties 
e, to "get closer" on a number. (Id.) These exchanges indicate that Judge Atherton 
determined complete restitution, as she is required to by statute, by accepting what ACS 
alleged it lost in the pre-sentence report. (See id.) Because defense counsel tacitly 
acknowledged that Mr. Speed would be paying some amount of restitution, and only 
disputed the total amount, Judge Atherton presumably wanted Mr. Speed to get started on 
those payments. (See id.) However, court-ordered restitution was never determined. (See 
id.) In fact, Judge Atherton requested more documentation regarding the factors for court-
ordered restitution prior to the hearing. (See id.) 
It is not reasonable to presume that Judge Atherton considered all the required 
factors before imposing court-ordered restitution on Ms. Speed; indeed, to presume that 
would be contrary to the plain meaning of the exchange between Judge Atherton and Mr. 
Speed. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should find that the trial court never determined 
court-ordered restitution, and the restitution order should therefore be vacated. 
C. The restitution award should be vacated because the State failed to prove the 
amount of restitution was caused by Mr. Speed's criminal activities. 
The restitution award should be vacated because the State did not prove that the 
amount alleged to be lost by ACS was caused by Mr. Speed's criminal activities. By 
requiring that the defense counsel file a motion for restitution, the trial court 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Speed. 
Restitution is only available for a victim "whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 77-38a-
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102(14)(a) (emphasis added). "[T]o include an amount in a restitution order, the State 
must prove that the victim has suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of 
the defendant's criminal activities." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ~ 10,221 P.3d 
273. An order of restitution is prohibited "for criminal activities for which the defendant 
did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(a); State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ~ 9, 60 P.3d 582. 
Therefore, restitution may be awarded "only in cases where liability is clear as a 
matter of law and where the commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the 
injury or damages." State v. Poulsen, 2012 UT App 292, ~ 11, 288 P.3d 601 (citing State 
v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). "Utah has adopted a modified 'but 
for' test to determine whether pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities." 
Id. This test requires a showing that "( 1) the damages would not have occurred but for the 
conduct underlying the ... [defendant's] conviction and (2) the causal nexus between the 
[criminal] conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally)." 
Id. (alterations and omissions in original) ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Poulsen, the defendant was convicted of participating in a pyramid scheme, a 
Class B misdemeanor. See id. ~I 3. The defendant only admitted to "receiving 
compensation for the introduction of other persons in to the pyramid scheme." See id. At 
the restitution hearing, no witnesses were called, and the State relied solely on evidence 
presented in connection with the criminal conviction. See id. The statute under which the 
defendant was convicted, paired with the allegations to which he admitted to, were 
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insufficient to establish a nexus between the defendant's actions and the injuries. See id. 
~ The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order of restitution because the 
prosecutor had failed to describe a causal nexus between the actions and injuries. See id. 
~14. Further, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant was not granted a proper 
restitution hearing when the hearing did not fully address the issue of causation, and when 
the victim's "bare bones proffers" failed to flesh out the causal nexus between the 
criminal conduct and the loss, leaving little basis to determine whether that nexus was not 
too attenuated. See id. ~~ 15-16. 
Setting aside the fact that Mr. Speed was never afforded a full restitution hearing, 
the allegations on the record are insufficient to establish and prove that Mr. Speed is 
responsible for $126,547, the full amount of losses claimed by ACS. There is no evidence 
on the record to support that amount as the losses related to Mr. Speed's criminal 
activities. Indeed, Mr. Speed claimed that some of the phones he sent out were sent to 
actual customers, and Salt Lake City detectives were able to sift through some evidence to 
find which phones were illegally sent out. (R38.) Such "bare bones proffers" of the 
amount lost by ACS are insufficient to establish the causal nexus between Mr. Speed's 
activities and ACS' alleged loss. 
Utah law is clear that the burden is on the State to prove the fact and amount of 
restitution. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ~ 10. However, there is no record that the 
prosecutor ever put on evidence or argued for restitution at sentencing. Instead, the trial 
court accepted the presentence report prepared and submitted by AP&P, and asked 
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defense counsel for more information regarding restitution. This Court should find that 
the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on restitution to the defense, and 
the State failed to prove that the full amount of restitution claimed in the presentence 
report was caused by Mr. Speed's activities. Therefore, the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying Mr. Speed's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Request for 
Restitution Hearing. 
II. Appellant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 
of Appellant's federal and state constitutional rights when he failed to follow 
up on Appellant's request for a restitution hearing. 
If the Court of Appeals finds that defendant waived any objection to the restitution 
amount by failing to file a motion for a restitution hearing, then it should find that Mr. 
Speed received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to properly 
object to the amount of restitution and file a motion as requested by the Court. 
A. Preservation 
Traditionally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in collateral 
proceedings. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). However, an 
ineffectiveness claim may be raised for the first time on direct appeal "if the trial record is 
adequate to permit decision of the issue and [the] defendant is represented by counsel 
other than trial counsel." Id.; see also State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 1 12, 989 P.2d 1065; 
State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1996). In this case, the trial record is adequate to 
permit the Court of Appeals to decide this issue, and Mr. Speed is represented by conflict 
counsel. 
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B. Applicable standard 
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel. The 
right to counsel has been construed to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v. McNicol, 554 
P .2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). The United States Supreme Court set forth the proper test for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Mr. Speed's trial counsel's 
performance was deficient as set forth herein. As a result of this deficient perfonnance, 
Mr. Speed was deprived of his due process in contesting the amount of restitution 
imposed on him. 
C. Mr. Speed's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he 
failed to move the Court for a restitution hearing when he knew that the 
amount of restitution was in dispute. 
Should the Court determine that Mr. Speed waived his objections to restitution 
because his trial counsel failed to file a motion for a restitution hearing, or otherwise 
clearly object, this Court should find that Mr. Speed's trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel. An attorney has a duty to represent the interests of a client with 
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"zeal and loyalty." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357,359 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
This duty is "so essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system that its faithful 
discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of Professional Conduct, but also, in criminal 
cases, by the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of 
counsel." Id. 
It is clear from the record that Mr. Speed's trial counsel, Brock Van de Kamp, 
knew that Mr. Speed disputed the full amount of restitution and wanted a hearing. (Rl22 
at 10: 10-11: 10.) Judge Atherton directed him to file a motion for restitution with the 
court. (Id.) This Court should find that trial counsel's failure to file the requested motion 
for restitution was deficient, and his error of failing to object to the amount of restitution 
was so serious as to deprive Mr. Speed of his statutory right to a full and complete 
restitution hearing. 
Trial counsel's deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Speed because it allowed 
him to have an incredibly large amount of restitution imposed against him. Mr. Speed told 
the trial court that he was eighteen months into his probation before he received any 
notice of the restitution amount that he would be paying, and by then there was already 
$7,000 in accumulated interest. (R60.) Mr. Speed is a young man and recently married, 
and works for about minimum wage. (R35-42.) He has been extremely prejudiced by 
failing to receive his statutory right to a full and complete restitution hearing, and from 
being burdened with a debt of restitution that will be close to impossible for him to pay 
off given his circumstances. Therefore, this Court should find that Mr. Speed's trial 
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counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Speed requests that the restitution order be 
vacated. In the alternative, Mr. Speed requests that this Court remand the case to the trial 
court for a full restitution hearing. 
DATED this ~~ay of October, 2015. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
J~ 
KRISTINA H. RUEDAS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUMB 
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUMC 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
• (I) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) 
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by the defendant. 
e (b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
( c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided 
in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
( 4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) 
(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include 
• any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
Cl (b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
• 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in 
bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim 
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
( c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider: 
(i) the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b ); 
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial declaration 
described in Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other 
obligations of the defendant; 
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) 
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time 
of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been detennined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an 
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
